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I. INTRODUCTION
In Rapanos v. United States, the Supreme Court sought to define the scope
of the Clean Water Act.' The Court split on a 4-1-4 vote.' Consequently, the
lower courts must decide the controlling opinion. In putative reliance on the
Supreme Court's standard for interpreting fractured decisions, set forth in
Marks v. UnitedStates,' the circuit courts have either adopted the lone Kennedy
concurrence or rejected Marks as unworkable in favor of an either/or test al-
lowing the government to establish federal jurisdiction under either the Ken-
nedy concurrence or the Scalia plurality in Rapanos. In each case, the circuit
court either misconstrued Marks or misinterpreted Rapanos. This article
makes the case that Marks is readily adaptable to the Rapanos decision and the
Scalia plurality is controlling.
I. BACKGROUND
The Clean Water ActV prohibits the discharge of pollutants, including
dredged and fill material, into "navigable waters" without a federal permit' and
1. M. Reed Hopper is a Senior Attorney with the Pacific Legal Foundation who represented
John Rapanos in Rapanos v. United States.
2. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 730-32 (2006).
3. Id. at 718.
4. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
5. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1275 (2012).
6. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2012).
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defines the term "navigable waters" as "waters of the United States."' In Ra-
panos v. United States, the Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") claimed the
Clean Water Act covered the shallow wetlands on John Rapanos's Michigan
lots.' When he graded the lots for construction, Corps officials cited Mr. Ra-
panos for filling "navigable waters" without a permit in violation of the Clean
Water Act.' The district court found Mr. Rapanos liable because the wetlands
on his property bordered a manmade drainage ditch that flowed intermittently
through a series of conduits to a navigable-in-fact watercourse miles away.o The
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court on the theory that any
hydrological connection with a traditional navigable water was sufficient for fed-
eral jurisdiction, no matter how slight." The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the
Sixth Circuit, however, invalidating this expansive interpretation of the Clean
Water Act'
Five of the nine Justices ruled the Corps had gone too far and could not
regulate all waters based solely on a hydrological connection to a downstream
navigable-in-fact waterway. ChiefJustice Roberts observed:
Rather than refining its view of its authority in light of our decision in
SWANCC,'" and providing guidance rneriting deference under our generous
standards, the Corps chose to adhere to its essentially boundless view of the
scope of its power. The upshot today is another defeat for the agency."
Writing for a four-member plurality, Justice Scalia agreed:
In applying the definition to "ephemeral streams," "wet meadows," storm sew-
ers and culverts, "directional sheet flow during storm events," drain tiles, man-
made drainage ditches, and dry arroyos in the middle of the desert, the Corps
has stretched the term "waters of the United States" beyond parody. The plain
language of the statute simply does not authorize this "Land Is Waters" ap-
proach to federal jurisdiction.
Justices Scalia, Thomas, Alito, and Roberts, determined the language, struc-
ture, and purpose of the Clean Water Act limited federal authority to "relatively
permanent, standing or continuously flowing bodies of water" commonly rec-
ognized as "streans, oceans, rivers and lakes" connected to traditional navigable
waters.". The Scalia plurality would also authorize federal regulation of wetlands
physically abutting these water bodies, but only if they have a continuous surface
7. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2012).
8. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 719, 729-30 (2006).
9. Id.
10. SeeUnited States v. Rapanos, 190 F.Supp. 2d 1011, 1013 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
11. See United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 642 (6th Cii. 2004). See id. at 639.
12. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 757.
13. Sec Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Anny Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159,
168 (2001) ("SWANCl1.
14. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 758.
15. Id. at 734.
16. Id. at 716, 739.
48 Volumec 21
RUNNING DOWN THE OPINION IN JAPANOS
water connection whereby the wetland and water body are literally "indistin-
guishable.""
AlthoughJustice Kennedy joined the plurality in the result, providing a five-
member majority in favor of Mr. Rapanos, he proposed a different standard for
determining "waters of the United States" subject o federal control under the
Clean Water Act. Under a "significant nexus" test, the federal government
could regulate a wetland if it significantly affects a navigable-in-fact waterway."
This excludes from federal regulation remote drains, ditches, and streams with
insubstantial flows and only speculative evidence of a "significant nexus."'
The four Justices in the dissent (Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer)
took the view that the Corps could regulate essentially any feature that advanced
the statutory goal of maintaining the "chemical, physical, and biological integrity
of the Nation's waters."" In effect, the dissent would authorize federal regula-
tion of the entire hydrological chain on the premise that virtually all waters are
interconnected and therefore affect the integrity of the Nation's waters.
The Court's split decision derives from a difference in judicial philosophy.
The dissent, authored by Justice Stevens, would uphold any regulatory interpre-
tation of the Clean Water Act that furthers the perceived purpose of the act,
whereas the Scalia plurality believes implementation of the Clean Water Act
must fit the statutory language. The problem with the dissent's view is that it
"substitute[s] the purpose of the statute for its text."' The Scalia plurality
harshly condemned this interpretive philosophy:
And as for advancing "the purposes of the Act": We have often criticized that
last resort of extravagant interpretation, noting that no law pursues its purpose
at all costs, and that the textual limitations upon a law's scope are no less a part
of its "purpose" than its substantive authorizations.
The Court's reference to a "textual limitation" in the Clean Water Act is
the term "navigable waters." The plurality believed the term must mean some-
thing. So, too, did justice Kennedy, who reproached the dissent for reading the
term right out of the statute."
The plurality's unwillingness to give the federal government carte blanche
to regulate virtually all waters in the United States recognizes that unfettered
regulation is incompatible with the rule of law. The rule of law imposes limits
on federal authority as a fundamental safeguard against arbitrary government.
It ensures that the means of accomplishing the desired ends (no matter how
laudable) are fair, consistent, predictable, and orderly-protections currently
lacking under the government's ever-expanding interpretation of its authority
under the Clean Water Act.
Moreover, the Clean Water Act has more than one purpose. While the
17. Id. at 755.
18. Id. at 759 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
19. Id. at 780.
20. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 779-81.
21. Id. at 787 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 755.
23. Id. at 752.
24. Id. at 778.
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dissent focused exclusively on the stated objective "to restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nations' waters,"' the plurality
emphasized the equally clear objective "to recognize, preserve, and protect he
primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate
pollution, to plan the development and use (including restoration, preservation,
and enhancement) of land and water resources . . . ."2
In view of these considerations, Justice Stevens's accusation that the Scalia
plurality is simply anti-environment2 ' seems petulant. One wonders if Jus-
tice Stevens would advocate such broad agency deference if the Corps had
stood by its original interpretation of the Clean Water Act in 1974 that the
agency could only regulate traditional navigable waters."
Although Rapanos provided a clear majority as to the result, the decision
rested on a 4-1-4 split as to rationale. The question now is which opinion is
controlling?
III. DETERMINING THE CONTROLLING OPINION
A. MARKs V. UNI1ED STA TES
In Marks v. United States the Supreme Court held:
When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining
the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be
viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judg-
ments on the narrowest grounds."
While this rule has been difficult to apply in some cases, it is the only rule sanc-
tioned by the Supreme Court for interpreting its split decisions.'
The language of Marks was not unique to the case. It derived from the
Supreme Court's decision in Gregg v. Geoigia.` In Gregg, the Court examined
Furmian v. Geoigia which involved a challenge to the constitutionality of a Geor-
gia death penalty statute. " In Furinan, as in Rapanos, five Justices agreed in the
judgments, but the Court split on the legal standard that should be applied to
death penalty cases.' Two concurring Justices felt that capital punishment was
unconstitutional in all cases, whereas the other three Justices believed that cap-
ital punishment was unconstitutional only in the circumstances presented in
Fum-nan.` Thus in Gregg the Court held that the plurality controls: "Since five
Justices wrote separately in support of the judgments in Furian, the holding of
25. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2017).
26. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2017).
27. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 798 n.8.
28. Sec SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159 at 168.
29. Marks, 430 U.S. at 193.
30. See In re Cook, 322 B.R. 336, 341 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2005) ("The only approach ap-
proved by the Supreme Court is the 'narrowest grounds' approach.").
31. 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976).
32. Id. at 162-63; see genciaiv Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
33. See Fuman, 408 U.S. at 257, 314.
34. See id. at 240, 306, 310.
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the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who con-
curred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds
In Marks, the Supreme Court determined the standard for regulating ob-
scene material.' To answer that question, the Court turned to Memoirs v. At-
torney General of the Connnonwealth ofMassachusetts in which a majority of
the Supreme Court held a lower court incorrectly concluded a book was ob-
scene and did not have First Amendment protection." Three Justices in the
plurality decided the book was protected from government regulation if it was
otherwise "obscene" but had some social redeeming value." Two otherJustices
concurred in the judgment relying on what the Court called "broader grounds"
that the First Amendment provided an absolute shield against government ac-
tion to suppress obscenity." A sixth Justice concurred in the judgement based
on his view that only "hardcore pornography may be suppressed."" As a logical
subset of the other concurring opinions, the Court concluded in Marks the
three-justice plurality was the "narrowest grounds" for the judgment and the
controlling opinion in the case." Put another way:
The Justices supporting the broader legal rule must necessarily recognize the
validity of the narrower legal rule. That is, if a statute is found to be constitu-
tionally permissible pursuant to a strict scrutiny standard of review, then it is
necessarily permissible pursuant to a rational basis standard of review. From
the text of the alternative concurning opinions, it is possible to determine that
if all of the Justices apply the narrower rule, the outcome would have been the
same.
Under Marks, therefore, the "narrowest grounds" means the opinion which
is "a logical subset of other, broader opinions."" Application of this rule to
Rapanos hould be straightforward. The Scalia plurality appears more narrowly
drawn as a logical subset of the Kennedy test. Even the dissent thought so: "m
the unlkely event that the pluralty test is met but Justice Kennedy's is no4
courts should ... uphold the Corps' jurisdiction."
However, many of the lower courts that have applied Marks to Rapanos
found the rule unworkable. But that is because these courts misconstrued
Marks and misrepresented the Rapanos decision.
B. NORTHERN CALIFORNL4 RIVER WATCH V. CITY OFHEALDsBURG
The Ninth Circuit was the first Circuit Court to apply Marks to the Rapanos
decision. In Northern CahTornia River Watch v. Healdsburg (River Watch I),
35. Gregg 428 U.S. at 169 n.15.
36. Marks, 430 U.S. at 188-90.
37. A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney Gen. of
Mass., 383 U.S. 413, 419, 421 (1966).
38. Id. at 419, 443.
39. Id. at 421, 424.
40. Id. at 421.
41. Marks, 430 U.S. at 193.
42. Ken Kimura, A Legitimacy Model for the Interpretation of Plurality Decisions, 77
CORNELL L. REv. 1593, 1603-04 (1992).
43. See King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
44. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 810 n.14 (emphasis added).
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the court summarily concluded the Kennedy concurrence was controlling' with-
out further discussion:
Justice Kennedy, constituting the fifth vote for reversal, concurred only in the
judgment and, therefore, provides the controlling rule of law. See Mwks v.
United States, 430 IJ.S. 188 (1977) (citation omitted) (explaining that "[wlhen
a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result
enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as
that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgment on the
narrowest grounds") .
This summary disposition adds nothing to an understanding of the Mdrs
analysis. It is unclear why the Ninth Circuit concluded the Kennedy concur-
rence is controlling, and this conclusion has been drawn into question by more
recent Ninth Circuit precedent, discussed later.
C. UNITED STA TS V. GERKE
United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc. was the next appellate case to apply
Maks to the Rapanos decision." Gerke was charged with filling "waters of the
United States" without a federal pennit under the Clean Water Act." Gerke
challenged the government's jurisdiction in the case and petitioned the Su-
prerne Court after losing in the Seventh Circuit." The High Court granted cer-
tiorari and remanded the case in light of Rapanos." On remand, the Seventh
Circuit held in a per cuiun decision thatJustice Kennedy's concurring opinion
was controlling because: (1) that opinion was the narrowest opinion (i.e., least
restrictive of government authority); and (2) when joined with the four dissent-
ers, Justice Kennedy's opinion made up a majority on the court.51 However, the
court's first mistake was to misstate the Marks test. According to Gerke,
When a majority of the Supreme Court agrees only on the outcome of a case
and not on the ground for that outcome, lower court judges are to follow the
narrowest grounds to which a majority of the Justices would have assented if
forced to choose.
This misstatement of Maiks allowed the Seventh Circuit to aggregate the Ken-
nedy concurrence with the four dissenting Justices to reach a majority. But
Marks does not allow consideration of the dissenting opinions in a fractured
decision like Rapanos.
Properly stated, Maks holds that when the Supreme Court issues a divided
opinion with no single opinion conunanding a majority, the holding of the case
"may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurredin the
45. N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Hcaldsburg, 457 F.3d 1023, 1025 (9th Cir. 2006).
46. Id. at 1029.
47. United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 724 (7th Cir. 2006).
48. Id. at 723.
. 49. Id. at 723-24.
50. Id. at 724.
51. Id. at 724-25.
52. Id. at 724 (citing Marks, 430 U.S. at 193).
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judgments on the narrowest grounds."' Therefore, the dissent is off-limits in a
Marks analysis.
In Gibson v. American Cyanamid. Co., the Seventh Circuit revisited its
Gerke decision, holding it had been wrong to count the Rapanos dissent in rul-
ing on the controlling opinion.' Gibson explained that it makes sense to ex-
clude dissenting opinions because "by definition, the dissenters have disagreed
with both the plurality and any concurring Justice" as to the outcome as well as
how the governing standard should apply.5 It is very likely, the court said, that
if the dissenters disagree (and are cited) then the lower courts and litigants "will
not have a clear idea on the contours of the standard and how to apply it in
future cases."" "This is not the way to make binding precedent.""
Accordingly, in Gibson the Seventh Circuit concluded its reliance on the
Rapanos dissent in Gerke was dicta and not necessary to the decision." Never-
theless, Gibson affirmed Gerke's conclusion that Justice Kennedy's concur-
rence in Rapanos was the "narrowest grounds" and therefore controlling." This
was the court's second mistake.
Gerke equates "narrowest grounds" with the opinion least restrictive of gov-
ernment authority: "[Justice Kennedy's] test is narrower (so far as reigning in
federal authority is concerned) than the plurality in most cases . . ." and there-
fore controlling. ' But Gerke cites no authority for that proposition. Marks
does not declare that "narrowest grounds" means least restrictive of government
authority. Nor could that standard apply universally because not all split deci-
sions involve the government. If the court had been true to Mauks and dis-
counted the dissent, it could have found a majority by looking to the Rapnaos
plurality as the "narrowest grounds." Whenever the plurality would find a ju-
risdictional water, Justice Kennedy would agree because the plurality test is a
logical subset ofjustice Kennedy's broader "significant nexus" test. Together,
the four Justices in the plurality and Justice Kennedy constitute a five-member
majority-without distorting Marks.
In Rapanos, the plurality thought justice Kennedy's "significant nexus" ap-
proach was not much narrower than the outsized reading the Corps (and the
dissent) gave the Act. "Justice Kennedy tips a wink at the agency, inviting it to
try its same expansive reading again."" And, as noted above, the dissent opined
that "Justice Kennedy's approach ... treats more of the Nation's waters as
within the Corps' jurisdiction" and it would be a rare case when the plurality test
is met and the Kennedy test is not."
The plurality sought to restrict federal authority to those wetlands that: (1)
53. Marks, 430 U.S. at 193.
54. Gibson v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 760 F.3d 600, 621 (7th Cir. 2014) ("Of course, Marks
itself is binding on us, and instructs that only those positions of the Justices concurring in the
outcome count in the analysis.").
55. Id. at 620.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 621.
59. Sce id.
60. Gerke Excavatig, Inc., 464 F.3d at 724-25.
61. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 756 n.15.
62. Id. at 754 n.14.
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are physically adjacent to "a relatively permanent body of water connected to
traditional interstate navigable waters;" and (2) have a continuous surface con-
nection with that water, making it diflicult to determine where the "water" ends
and the "land" begins.' In other words, the plurality opinion limits federal ju-
risdiction to wetlands that actually abut a significant tributary, such as a relatively
permanent river, lake or stream, connected to a traditional navigable water, and
which is "indistinguishable" from that tributary, such as the wetlands in Unmited
States v. Riverside Bayvie w Homes, Inc."
In Riverside Bayview the Supreme Court allowed federal regulation of an
abutting marshland characterized by saturated soil conditions and weland veg-
etation that literally extended from the marshland to the waterway.' In contrast,
Justice Kennedy would allow federal regulation of any wetland alone or in com-
bination with other similar wetlands that (in the aggregate) have a significant
nexus with a downstream navigable water, even if no physical hydrological con-
nection exists." It is axiomatic that a wetland that is hydrologically "indistin-
guishable" from a relatively permanent ributary to a traditional navigable water
would satisfy justice Kennedy's significant nexus test. The plurality test is there-
fore a narrower subset of the broader Kennedy test.
In Gibson, the Seventh Circuit took "narrowest grounds" to mean "that
Maks applies only when one opinion is the logical subset of other, broader
opinions."" Under this standard, the Seventh Circuit should have found the
plurality controlling in Rapanos. Instead, the circuit distorted Marks to maxim-
ize government control over navigable waters. Gerke, and to a lesser extent
Gibson, has all the hallmarks of a result-oriented opinion. Gerke finds no sup-
port in Marks. Rather than providing a citable interpretation of how to find the
controlling opinion in Japanos, the case should serve as a caution for other
courts.
D. UNITED STATES V. JOHNSON
In [United States v. Johnson, the government cited landowners under the
Clean Water Act converting wetlands to cranberry bogs without a federal per-
mit.' In defense, the landowners challenged the government's statutory juris-
diction." A split panel of the First Circuit Court of Appeals upheld federal
jurisdiction citing a "hydrological connection" to navigable waters."o Shortly
thereafter, the Supreme Court invalidated that basis for jurisdiction in Rapanos.
On remand to the district court, the First Circuit rejected Gerke's interpretation
of Maks and declared the trial court could establish federal jurisdiction under
either the Scalia plurality test or the Kennedy "significant nexus" test.' But this
63. Id at 742.
64. See id. at 755; scc also United States v. Riversidc Bavview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121,
134 (1985).
65. Riecjside Baysicn; 474 U.S. at 131.
66. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 779.
67. Gibson, 760 F.3d at 619 (citing King, 950 F.2d at 781).
68. 467 F.3d 56,58 (1st Cir. 2006).
69. Id.
70. Id
71. Id. at 66.
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just exacerbated the confusion over how to read Marks and Rapanos.
The First Circuit thought it curious that Gerke equated "narrowest
grounds" with the opinion least restrictive of federal authority. "Such an equa-
tion," the court stated, "leaves unanswered the question of how one would de-
termine which opinion is controlling in a case where the government is not a
party."" The court found it "just as plausible to conclude that the narrowest
ground of decision in Rapanos is the ground most restrictive of government
authority (the position of the plurality)," because, the court concluded, "that
ground avoids the constitutional issue of how far Congress can go in asserting
jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause.""
In contrast to the Seventh Circuit's reading of Marks in Gerke, the First
Circuit suggested the "narrowest grounds" might sensibly be interpreted to
mean the "less far-reaching-common ground,"" or the opinion "most clearly
tailored to the specific fact situation before the Court and thus applicable to the
fewest cases."" Relying on Ing v. Palmer," the First Circuit noted the D.C.
Circuit found "Marks is workable-one opinion can be meaningfully regarded
as narrower' than another-only when one opinion is a logical subset of other,
broader opinions."" "In other words," the First Circuit explained, "the 'narrow-
est grounds' approach makes the most sense when two opinions reach the same
result in a given case, but one opinion reaches that result for less sweeping rea-
sons than the other."" According to the First Circuit, Marks followed this ap-
proach.
For examples, the court cited Furman7 and Memoir&s upon which Marks
was based. In Furman, the First Circuit observed, "the Justices who concluded
that capital punishment was per se unconstitutional would always strike down
future death penalty sentences" but the Justices who found the death penalty
unconstitutional only as administered in Furman "would only strike down cap-
ital sentences in a subset of future capital cases."' Likewise, in Memobrs, "two
Justices would always require a ruling in favor of protecting speech, but the view
of three other Justices that only non-obscene speech is protected would extend
First Amendnentprotection only to a subset of such cases."" The First Circuit
therefore concluded the "less sweeping opinion in each case [i.e. the opinions
that are the logical subset of the other per se opinions] represents the 'narrowest
grounds' for the decision.""
Having concluded that Marks applies where one opinion is the subset of
72. Id. at 63.
73. Id. (emphasis added).
74. Johnson, 467 F.3d at 63 (quoting Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d
1234, 1247 (11th Cir. 2001)).
75. Mark Alan Thurmon, Note- When the Court Divides: Reconsidering the Pecedenta
Value of Supieme CoultPlalityDecisions, 42 DuKE LJ. 419, 420-21 (1992).
76. 950 F.2d at 781 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
77. johnson, 467 F.3d at 63.
78. Id. at 64.
79. See generally Furnan, 408 U.S. 238.
80. See generally Memohis, 383 U.S. 413.
81. Johnson, 467 F.3d at 64.
82. Id. (emphasis in original).
83. Id.
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another concurring opinion, the First Circuit then held the understanding of
"narrowest grounds" does not translate easily to the present situation: "The
cases in which Justice Kennedy would limit federal jurisdiction are not a subset
of the cases in which the plurality would limit jurisdiction."" For this reason,
the court rejected Gerke's conclusion that, under Marks, Justice Kennedy's
lone concurrence is controlling in Rapanos. Instead, the First Circuit held the
"federal government can establish jurisdiction over the target sites if it can meet
either the plurality's or Justice Kennedy's standard as laid out in Rapanos."
Yet this raises the following question: why didn't the First Circuit reach the
obvious, perhaps inescapable, conclusion that the plurality test is a "logical sub-
set" of the Kennedy test and therefore a perfect translation to the present situa-
tion? The answer lies in the Court's acceptance of the claim, cited in Gerke,
that "in cases where there is a small surface water connection to a stream or
brook, the plurality's.jurisdictional test would be satisfied," but Justice Ken-
nedy's "significant nexus" test would not." This, however, is a fallacy that de-
rives from Justice Kennedy's hyperbolic characterization of the plurality opin-
ion. According to Justice Kennedy,
IBly saying the Act covers wetlands (however remote) possessing a surface-
water connection with a continuously flowing stream (however small), the plu-
rality's reading would permit applications of the statute as far from traditional
federal authority as are the waters it deems beyond the statute's reach."
Nowhere does the plurality state or imply such a standard. Justice Kennedy
cited no language from the plurality opinion in support of this characterization
of the plurality position because he cannot. Neither did the Gerke or Johnson
courts. To the contrary, the plurality expressly rejected this reading of the Act:
Therefore, only those wetlands with a continuous surface connection to bodies
that are "waters of the United States" in their own right, so that there is no
clear demarcation between "waters" and wetlands, are "adjacent to" such wa-
ters and covered by the Act. Wetlands with only an intermittent, physically
remote hydrologic connection to "waters of the United States" do not impli-
cate the boundary-drawing problem of Riverside Bayview, and thus lack the
necessary connection to covered waters that we described as a "significant
nexus" in SWANCC. Thus, establishing that wetlands such as those at the
Rapanos and Carabell sites are covered by the Act requires two findings: first,
that the adjacent channel contains a "watelrl of the United States," (i.e., a rel-
atively permanent body of water connected to traditional interstate navigable
waters); and second, that the wetland has a continuous surface connection with
that water, makin it difficult to determine where the "water" ends and the
"wetland" begins.
This is the precise holding of the plurality opinion. The plurality test in
Rapanos requires jurisdictional wetlands to be so bound up with covered waters
84. Id.
85. Id. at 66.
86. Id at 64.
87. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 776-77 (KenncdvJ., concurring).
88. Id. at 742 (internal citations omitted).
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that the two become indistinguishable, like the marshland in Riverside Bayview,
that literally merged with the adjacent creek so that one could not tell where the
"water" ends and the "wetland" begins. This is a far cry from the wetland test
ascribed to the plurality by justice Kennedy and accepted at face value by Gerke
and Johnson.
In addition to being gulled by Justice Kennedy's mischaracterization of the
plurality opinion, the First Circuit was taken in by the Rapanos dissent that dis-
senting votes should be counted in determining the controlling opinion in split
Supreme Court decisions.
The First Circuit cites, with approval, that a number of Circuits have aban-
doned the Marks approach to split opinions or applied Marks selectively." In-
stead, they have sought to divine the controlling opinion in the Supreme Court's
fragmented decisions, like Rapanos, by adopting a "pragmatic" approach to the
situation." This approach involves assessing which grounds would "command
a majority of the Court"" In Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., for example, the
Second Circuit concluded: "In essence, what we must do is find common
ground shared by five or more justices." Similarly, in United States v. Wl-
hams, the Ninth Circuit held,
We need not find a legal opinion which a majority joined, but merely "a legal
standard which, when applied, will necessarily produce results with which a
majority of the Court from that case would agree.""
The First Circuit in Johnson used similar logic to justify its determination
that federal jurisdiction over wetlands could be established under either the plu-
rality test in Rapanos or the Kennedy test: "IfJustice Kennedy's test is satisfied,
then at leastJustice Kennedy plus the four dissenters would supportjurisdiction.
If the plurality's test is satisfied, then at least the four plurality members plus the
four dissenters would support jurisdiction."" The court is oblivious to the fact
that under a proper application of Marks, where the plurality test is viewed as a
subset of the Kennedy test, a finding of jurisdiction under the plurality test
would always result in the support of all nine Justices.
The First Circuit also relies on Student Pubhlic Interest Research Group of
New Jersey, Inc. v. A T& T Bell Labs," wherein the Third Circuit examined
Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean An' to determine
the controlling opinion. In Pennsylvamia, the Supreme Court was asked to ad-
dress the availability of contingency fees under federal fee-shifting statutes."
The court split along the lines of Rapanos with four Justices in the plurality, four
89. Johnson, 467 F.3d at 64.
90. Id.
9 1. Id.
92. Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1182 (2d Cir. 1992).
93. United States v. Williams, 435 F.3d 1148, 1157 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 693 (3d Cir. 1991)).
94. Johnson, 467 F.3d at 64.
95. 842 F.2d 1436, 1438-39 (3d Cir. 1988).
96. 483 U.S. 711 (1987).
97. See id. at 714.
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Justices in the dissent, and Justice O'Connor's lone concurrence in the judg-
ments." The Third Circuit thus determined that "[b]ecause the four dissenters
would allow contingency multipliers in all cases in which Justice O'Connor
would allow them, her position commands a majority of the Court" and is con-
trolling.'
In King v. Palmei;'0 o however, the D.C. Circuit took a different approach.
The D.C. Circuit refused to examine the points of commonality among Justice
O'Connor's opinion and that of the dissent, relying mainly on a literal reading
of Marks that the holding is the position of the Justices "who concured in the
judgments on the narrowest grounds.""' The D.C. Circuit also relied on the
fact that the Supreme Court had not explicitly applied Marks in a way that would
combine concurring and dissenting votes.'" In as much as Marks is the only
approach expressly authorized by the Supreme Court for interpreting split de-
cisions," the First Circuit should have followed the DC Circuit rather than the
other circuits that have abandoned Marks in favor or a more "pragmatic" ap-
proach.
E. UNITED STA TES v ROBISON
In United States v. Robison, a pipe manufacturer was convicted for dis-
charging wastewater into a nearby waterway in violation of its Clean Water Act
discharge permit."' On appeal, the defendants argued the jury should have
been instructed that the government must establish jurisdiction based solely on
the Rapanos plurality and not on the Kennedy concurrence." The Eleventh
Circuit rejected Johnson's either/or approach and adopted the Gerke holding
that the Kennedy opinion was the "narrowest grounds" and controlling under
Marks because it was the least restrictive of federal authority." The court's
Marks analysis is instructive, albeit flawed.
First, the court observed it would be a rare case in which the plurality test is
met and the Kennedy test is not.11 And, "as practical matter" such rare cases
can be dismissed."' This concession supports the argument that when it comes
to detennining jurisdictional waters, the plurality test is a subset of the Kennedy
test. Therefore, under Maks, the plurality test should control. But the Elev-
enth Circuit bought into the Seventh Circuit's canard that the "narrowest
grounds" is the opinion least restrictive of federal authority.'" The Eleventh
Circuit did not address how that rule. would apply when the govermnent is not
a party and cited no authority for that interpretation other than Gerke, which
98. See id. at 731.
99. Student Pub., 842 F.2d at 1451.
100. 950 F.2d 771 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
101. Id. at 783 (emphasis in oiiginal).
102. Id.
103. See In rc Cook, 322 B.R. at 34 1.
104. United States v. Robison, 505 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2007).
105. Id. at 1219.
106. Id. at 1221-22.
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assumed, without explanation, that the "narrowest grounds" is the least restric-
tive of govermnent authority.
Second, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the First Circuit's reliance on the dis-
sent in Johnson."o After stating that Marks applies only to "those Members who
concurred in the judgements," the court acknowledged, "[we simply cannot
avoid the command of Marks.""' Moreover, the court held that dissenters, by
definition, have notjoined in the judgment."' Therefore, " i] n [the court's] view,
Marks does not direct lower courts interpreting fractured Supreme Court deci-
sions to consider the positions of those who dissented."" The court took this
one step further citing the D.C. Circuit in Kig v. Palmer "We do not think we
are free to combine a dissent with a concurrence to form a Marks majority.""
"It would be inconsistent with Marks," the Eleventh Circuit continued, "to allow
the dissenting RapanosJustices to carry the day and impose an 'either/or' test,
whereby the CWA jurisdiction would exist when either Justice Scalia's test or
Justice Kennedy's test is satisfied."" The court simply deemed the votes of the
dissenters as "of no moment under Marks.""'
Aside from the fact that counting dissenting votes conflicts with the Su-
preme Court's directive in Marks, which is bididing on the lower courts, the
either/or test creates uncertainty among the regulated public and legal practi-
tioners. It also allows the government to play legal games with alleged violators
of the Clean Water Act In the recent case of Hawkes v. United States," the
Army Corps of Engineers issued a Jurisdictional Determination asserting fed-
eral jurisdiction based on the Scalia plurality test" When the landowners chal-
lenged the determination in an administrative setting, the Corps changed tactics
asserting for the first time that the wetlands at issue were subject to federal con-
trol under the Kennedy "significant nexus" test, which burdened the landown-
ers with unnecessary delay and expense."' It is also bizarre that a circuit court
would apply two conflicting legal standards that, if raised in separate circuits,
would justify Supreme Court review to resolve the circuit conflict Marks avoids
these pitfalls by directing lower courts to find a single controlling opinion in split
Supreme Court decisions.
F. UNITED STA TES V CUNDIFF
United States v. Cundijinvolved landowners who were held to be in viola-
tion of the Clean Water Act for dredging and filling wetlands without a permit'L"
The trial court imposed an injunction against the Cundiffs to restore the prop-
erty and assessed a civil fine.' The Cundiffs challenged federal jurisdiction on
110. See Robison, 505 F.3d at 1220-21.
111. Id. at 1221.
112. Id.
113. Id. (emphasis in orignal).
114. Id. (citng King, 950 F.2d at 783).
115. Id.
116. Robison, 505 F.3d. at 1221.
117. Hawkes Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 963 F. Supp. 2d 868 (D. Mim. 2013).
118. Id. at 871.
119. Id.
120. 555 F.3d 200, 204-05 (6thCir. 2009).
121. Id. at 205.
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appeal arguing the plurality decision is controlling because it is the most restric-
tive of government authority."
The Sixth Circuit rejected the Cundiffs argument stating "Maks does not
imply that the 'narrowest' Rapanos opinion is whichever one restricts jurisdic-
tion the most."" The court also rejected the least restrictive approach favored
in Gerke, Healdsbwg, and Robison.' Properly read, the Sixth Circuit held,
the "'narrowest' opinion refers to the one which relies on the least doctrinally
'far-reaching-common ground' among the Justices in the majority: it is the con-
cumng opinion that offers the least change to the law."" However, the court
did not apply this test to the Rapanos decision.
According to the Sixth Circuit, the controlling opinions in Memobrs and
Funman were "less doctrinally sweeping" than the other concurring opinions as
adduced by the fact that, in Memobrs, the controlling opinion disagreed that
obscenity laws per se violate the Constitution while, in Furman, the controlling
opinion disagreed that the death penalty was per se unconstitutional." Because
of this, the Sixth Circuit concluded Memoirs and Funnan were an easy fit for
Mais.m7 However, the .court asserted Marks is problematic if one opinion does
not fit within the broader circle drawn by others."
The Sixth Circuit declared Maiks did not fit Rapanos because "there is
quite little common ground between justice Kennedy's and the plurality's con-
ception of jurisdiction under the Act, and both flatly reject the other's views.""
Therefore, the court abandoned Marks and adopted the view of the First Circuit
in Johnson that there is no controlling opinion in Rapanos and the government
can establish jurisdiction under either the plurality test or the Kennedy test."
Nonetheless, every court to consider the controlling opinion in Rapanos
has held the Kennedy test covers more waters than the plurality test and is the
least restrictive of federal authority. The "common ground" between the two is
that when the plurality test is satisfied the Kennedy test is also satisfied-always.
The plurality test falls entirely within the broader circle drawn by justice Ken-
nedy. The fact that the plurality and justice Kennedy reject the other's views is
immaterial. In Memobrs and unnan the controlling opinion necessarily re-
jected the views of the other concurring opinions. By definition, disagreement
is a repudiation of another's views."' But this is no basis to reject the Marks
standard. The controlling opinion in Rapanos is just as apparent as the control-
ling opinions in Memobrs and Funnan. The plurality opinion is less doctrinally
sweeping than the Kennedy opinion. Like the per se opinions in Memoirs and
Funan, the Kennedy test is so broad that it takes in almost all waters. As the
122. Scc id. at 209.
123. Id.
124. Id. ("[It] makes little sense for the 'narrowest' opinion to be the one that restricts jurisdic-
tion the least .. ").
125. Id.
126. Cundif 555 F.3d at 209.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 210.
130. Id.
131. Disagrcemcnt, MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTiONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/di
etionary/disagreemnent (last visited Oct. 30, 2017).
60 - Volume 21
RUNNING DOWN THE OPINION IN RAPANOS
plurality notes, "Justice Kennedy tips a wink at the agency, inviting it to try its
same expansive reading again," and, under the Kennedy test, jurisdiction is so
broad that all waters affecting waters are waters.
G. OTHER CASES
Other circuit courts have addressed the controlling opinion in Rapanos, yet
these cases simply adopt the reasoning of other courts without adding anything
to the Marks analysis. The Ninth Circuit decision in Norther-n California River
Watch v. City of Healdsburg (River Watch II) affirms its decision in River
Watch Ithat the Kennedy test is controlling because it is the least restrictive of
federal authority. The Eighth Circuit in US. v. Baiej)' and the Third Circuit
in US. v. Donovan" both adhere to the conclusion and reasoning of the First
Circuit in Johnson that Marks cannot be applied to Rapanos because neither
opinion is a subset of the other; therefore jurisdiction can be established under
the either/or test.
1. United States v. Davis
The final case that deserves discussion is the Ninth Circuit's decision in
United States v. Davis."' Although the case does not address Rapanos, this en
banc decision provides a uuique perspective on Marks, which could be applied
to the Rapanos decision. In'Davis, the court examined a 4-1-4 split decision of
the Supreme Court in Ieeman v. United States.' Freeman discussed whether
a defendant, who entered into a plea agreement, could take advantage of a sen-
tence reduction under the federal Sentencing Guidelines." FourJustices in the
plurality held the defendant could always take advantage of the sentence reduc-
tion.o4 1 One Justice held the defendant could only take advantage of the sen-
tence reduction under certain circumstances."' And fourJustices in the dissent
held a defendant relying on a plea agreement could never take advantage of the
sentence reduction under the Guidelines.'
To determine the controlling opinion, the Ninth Circuit started with the
statement in Marks*
When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining
the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be
132. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 754-57.
133. See N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993, 1000 (9th Cir. 2007) (River
Watch II); N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 457 F.3d 1023, 1029-31 (9th Cir. 2006)
(River Watch I); but see N. Cal. River Watch v. Wilcox, 633 F.3d 766, 781 (9th Cir. 2010)
(stating River Watch Ildid not foreclose the possibility of establishing jurisdiction under the plu-
rality decision as well as the Kennedy concurrence).
134. United States v. Bailey, 571 F.3d 791, 799 (8th Cir. 2009).
135. United States v. Donovan, 661 F.3d 174, 181 (3rd Cir. 2011).
136. Johnson, 467 F.3d at 66.
137. 825 F.3d 1014 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc).
138. 564 U.S. 522 (2011).
139. See id. at 525.
140. See id. at 525, 534.
141. See id. at 542-44.
142. See id. at 544.
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viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judg-
ments on the narrowest grounds.'
The court observed that after forty years, the courts are still struggling "to
divine what the Supreme Court meant by the 'narrowest grounds.'"" As a re-
sult, two approaches have emerged. One is the reasoning-based approach
whereby the court seeks to determine if there is a common reasoning among
the concurring opinions such that one is a logical subset of the other, broader
opinion.'" "In essence, the narrowest opinion must represent a common de-
nominator of the Court's reasoning; it must embody a position implicitly ap-
proved by at least five Justices who support the judgment."" The other ap-
proach is results-based and defines "narrowest grounds" as "the rule that would
necessarily produce results with which a majority of Justices in the controlling
case would agree.""' Of the two, the Ninth Circuit preferred the reasoning-
based approach:
To foster clarity, we explicitly adopt the reasoning-based approach to applying
Malks. This approach is not only consistent with our most recent case law, []
but also makes the most sense. A fractured Supreme Court decision should
only bind the federal courts of appeal when a majority of the Justices agree
upon a single underlying rationale and one opinion can reasonably be de-
scribed as a logical subset of the other. When no single rationale commands
a majority of the Court, only the specific result is binding on lower federal
courts.'
But this approach to Marks did not help the court define the "narrowest
grounds" in Davis. To the contrary, the court found the concurring opinions
mutually exclusive in most cases; neither the plurality nor the lone concurrence
is a subset of the other."" Therefore, a standard Muiks analysis does not fit.
Although, Marks expressly limits the analysis to concurring opinions, the Ninth
Circuit cited examples where some courts, including the Supreme Court, had
looked to the dissent to find a majority."" Yet the Davis court determined that
even that approach was unavailing in Freeman because neither the plurality po-
sition nor the lone concurrence is a logical subset of the dissent, or vice versa."
The court acknowledged some overlap among the opinions but no case in
which one opinion would always agree with another."' Accordingly, the court
decided Marks could not be applied: "Simply put, no combination of" Ree-
inan ' dissenting and concurring opinions yields a binding rule that we must
follow."
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In the absence of a controlling opinion, the Ninth Circuit concluded it
could choose the opinion it found most persuasive, limited only by the result in
the case that a defendant relying on a plea agreement is not categorically barred
from taking advantage of a sentence reduction under the Guidelines." In the
end, the court found the plurality the most persuasive and applied that opinion
to the case."
This ruling has implications for determining the controlling opinion in Ra-
panos, at least within the Ninth Circuit. Under Daus, the court must first de-
termine whether the reasoning of the plurality and the Kennedy opinion is the
logical subset of the other.'" The plurality in Rapanos reasoned that a jurisdic-
tional wetland must have the characteristics of the wetland regulated in Riverside
Bayiew.'" That is, it must be "indistinguishable" from the abutting waterway,
not merely connected."' Justice Kennedy acknowledged that such a wetland is
subject to federal regulation under Riverside Bayview.'" Therefore, the plurality
opinion is a logical subset of the Kennedy opinion. But the converse is not true.
The plurality rejected Justice Kennedy's "significant nexus" test where the wet-
land is not "indistinguishable" from the abutting waterway as in Riverside
Bayview. ' The Kennedy test is broader than the plurality test for wetlands
such that the Kennedy test encircles the plurality test in all cases. This is differ-
ent from Freeman where the reasoning of the concurring opinions was not the
logical subset of another. Therefore, under a straightforward application of
Marks, the plurality opinion in Rapanos is controlling.
If, however, a court were to rule that the plurality in Rapanos is not the
logical subset of the Kennedy opinion, then, under Davs, the court could look
to the dissent to find a majority. It is undisputed that both the plurality and the
Kennedy concurrence are a subset of the broader dissent that would allow fed-
eral regulation of all waters to further the objectives of the Clean Water Act.
Combining the sole Kennedy opinion with the four-Justice dissent would yield
five votes. However, combining.the four-Justice plurality with the four-Justice
dissent would yield eight votes. Thus, even under this approach, the plurality
opinion is controlling.
If a court were to rule that Marks does not apply to Rapanos in any form,
as the First, Third, and Eighth Circuits have done, then, under Davis, the court
could simply choose to apply the most persuasive opinion. The only reason
any court has given for choosing the Kennedy test as controlling is because it is
least restrictive of federal authority. This may be enough to persuade some
courts that the Kennedy test is preferable to the more limiting plurality test-at
least until one looks at how the government has abused the Kennedy test since
the Rapanos decision. In reliance on the Kennedy "significant nexus" test, the
government promulgated regulations in 2015 that redefined "waters of the
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1028.
156. Id. at 1016.
157. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 742; see Riverside Baywew, 474 U.S. at 134-35.
158. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 755.
159. Id. at 765-67; see Riverside Bayvew, 474 U.S. at 134-35.
160. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 753-56; see Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 134-35.
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United Sates" (WOTUS)" subject to federal control under the Clean Water
Act that covers virtually all waters in the Nation and much of the land, such as
the 100-year floodplains. This includes:
1. All waters which are or were or nay be used in interstate or foreign com-
merce;
2. All interstate waters;
3. The territorial seas;
4. All impoundments of any "waters of the United States;"
5. All tributaries to waters 1-3. A "tributary" means a water that contributes
flow directly or through another water (including any impoundment), to waters
1-3, that has physical indicators of a bed and bank and an ordinary high water
mark. A tributary may be natural or man-made.
6. All waters adjacent to waters 1-5. "Adjacent" means bordering, contiguous,
or neighboring. "Neighboring" means within 100 feet of the ordinary high
water mark of waters 1-5. And, all waters within the 100-year floodplain of
waters 1-5 and not more than 1,500 feet from the ordinary high water
mark. Also, all waters within 1,500 feet of the high tide line of waters 1-3.
7. All of the following waters that have been determined on a case-by-case
basis to have a significant nexus to waters 1-3: prairie potholes, Carolina and
Delmarva bays, pocosins, western vernal pools, and Texas coastal prairie wet-
lands. "Significant nexus" means that a water, alone or in combination with
similarly situated waters in the region, significantly affects the chemical, physi-
cal, or biological integrity of waters 1-3. "Significant" means more than spec-
ulative or insubstantial and includes effects on any one of nine factors.
8. And, all waters located within the 100-year floodplain of waters 1-3 and all
waters within 4,000 feet of the high tide line or ordinary hi h water mark of
waters 1-5 when they have a significant nexus to waters 1-3.
There are very few exceptions, such as "puddles" which are undefined."'
Imagine a regulatory land-use regime so broad that puddles have to be ex-
pressly exempted. This is a long way from the "navigable waters" the Clean
Water Act actually authorizes the federal government to regulate. The
WOTUS rule shows the worst in regulatory overreach and justifies public fears
of an ever-growing administrative state. It defies commonsense; distorts the
plain language of the Clean Water Act; undermines the intent of Congress; sub-
jects millions of landowners to severe permittmg requirements and ruinous civil
and criminal penalties for noncompliance; and purposefully evades Supreme
Court precedent and constitutional constraints on federal power.
161. Clcan Water Rulc: Definition of"Waters of thc UnitedStates," 80 Fed. Reg. 37054 (pro-
poscdJunc 29, 2015) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328).
162. Id. at 37058-59.
163. Id. at 37099.
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When the rule was published, over thirty-one states and almost sixty agri-
cultural, industrial and private entities filed suit challenging the rule on statutory
and constitutional grounds.'" Two courts issued preliminary injunctions enjoin-
ing enforcement of the rule and held the rule was likely invalid and would be
overturned on subsequent review.'" In response to public outcry, the President
of the United States issued an Executive Order on February 28, 2017, calling
for reconsideration of the rule and advising the government to revise the rule
consistent with the Scalia plurality in Rapanos."
In light of these events, a prudent court would choose the plurality as the
controlling opinion in the Rapanos decision.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Circuit Courts are split on application of Marks to the Rapanos deci-
sion. Two approaches have emerged. In one, the courts hold the lone Ken-
nedy concurrence is the "narrowest grounds" and controlling under Marks be-
cause the Kennedy "significant nexus" test is less restrictive of federal authority
than the Scalia plurality. This is problematic because Marks does not define
"narrowest grounds" as the opinion least restrictive of government authority and
not all split decisions involve government action. In the other, the courts hold
Marks does not fit the Rapanos decision because the "narrowest grounds" can-
not be determined. Therefore, federal jurisdiction may be established under
either the Scalia plurality or the Kennedy concurrence. But this too is prob-
lematic because it gives equal weight to differing legal standards and overlooks
the fact that the Scalia plurality is a logical subset of the Kennedy opinion. In
every case where the plurality finds a jurisdictional wetland, Justice Kennedy
would agree. This constitutes a Marks majority. The Scalia plurality is there-
fore the "narrowest grounds" and the controlling opinion under Marks.
164. Sec, e.g., In re EPA, 803 F.3d 804, 805 (6th Cir. 2015).
165. Id. at 809; North Dakota v. EPA, 127 F. Supp. 3d 1047, 1060 (D.N.D. 2015).
166. Exec. Order No. 13,778, 82 Fed. Reg. 12497 (Feb. 28, 2017).
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